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COMMENTS
JURISDICTION IN PERSONAM OVER THE
NONRESIDENT TORTFEASOR
With respect to nonresident tortfeasors, Louisiana's Per-
sonal Jurisdiction over Nonresidents Statute provides that
a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
who, acting directly or through an agent, causes injury or dam-
age by an offense or quasi offense committed within the state
or by an offense or quasi offense committed outside of this state;
provided that, in the latter instance, the nonresident regularly
does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent
course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods
used or consumed or services rendered in this state.' Enacted
in 1964 to enable Louisiana courts to expand their jurisdiction
in personam over nonresidents to the fullest extent permitted
by the requirements of due process under recent decisions of the
Supreme Court, this statute has not as yet been tested in Lou-
isiana courts. The purpose of this Comment is to examine the
validity of this statute and to explore its possibilities.
ACT OR OMISSION IN THE STATE
This particular provision of the statute rests on the assump-
tion that the commission of an offense or quasi offense by act
or omission within the state is a sufficient basis to enable courts
to acquire jurisdiction in personam over the nonresident defend-
ant on causes of action arising from the single act within the
state. The extent of a state court's jurisdiction is a constitu-
tional question to be decided under principles of due process.2
In Pennoyer v. Neff the Supreme Court stated that "since the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitu-
tion, the validity of such [state court] judgments may be directly
questioned, and their enforcement in the State resisted, on the
ground that proceedings in a court of justice to determine the
personal rights and obligations of parties over whom that court
has no jurisdiction do not constitute due process of law." 8 The
traditional basis of jurisdiction at common law, the physical
power concept, was maintained in Pennoyer, thereby making it
1. LA. R.S. 13:3201(c), (d) (Supp. 1964).
2. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
3. I. at 733.
1966]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
necessary for the defendant to be served with process within the
state.
4
The Supreme Court was still relying on the concept of phys-
ical power as the basis for jurisdiction when called upon to ad-
judge the constitutionality of a state statute which provided that
a single act by the defendant within the state, the operation of
a motor vehicle on state highways and streets, was deemed to be
the appointment of the Secretary of State as the motorist's agent
for service of process in actions arising from the operation of
the motor vehicle within the state.5 The theory of the statute
was "implied consent," which was similar to the fiction employed
with respect to foreign corporations, namely, that doing busi-
ness in the state is consent to the appointment of Secretary of
State as agent for service of process in actions arising from
doing business in the state. The Nonresident Motorist Statute
was upheld, but the court based its decision on the fact that "mo-
tor vehicles are dangerous machines .... In the public interest
the State may make and enforce regulations reasonably calcu-
lated to promote care on the part of... [those] who use its high-
ways.., as well as to provide for a claimant a convenient method
by which he may sue to enforce his rights."' The Supreme Court
made it clear, in a later case, that jurisdiction in the nonresident
motorist cases was not based on consent, but rather on the great
potential for damage and injury possessed by the motor vehicle. 7
In Doherty v. Goodman," the Supreme Court upheld juris-
diction of an Iowa court over a New York resident, who main-
tained a local office in Iowa, on a cause of action arising from
a sale of stock in the state. The theory of implied consent to
service of process on the resident agent 9 was advanced, but the
decision rested on the ground that corporate securities were ex-
ceptional and could be subjected to special regulation. 10
In these cases the Supreme Court had upheld statutes which
based jurisdiction on a single act by nonresidents within the
state, operation of motor vehicle, 1 sale of stock,12 but had done
4. Id. at 714.
5. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
6. Id. at 356.
7. Olberding v. Illinois Central R.R., 346 U.S. 338 (1953).
8. 294 U.S. 623 (1935).
9. Id. at 627.
10. Ibid.
11. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
12. Doberty v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935).
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so by creating exceptions which confused the entire area of ju-
risdiction in personam over nonresidents. The general rule was
that jurisdiction must be based on the physical power of the
court over the defendant, which in turn necessitated service of
process within the state.13 The theory that the nonresident im-
pliedly consented to service on a designated resident of the state
had been the basis for the nonresident motorist acts14 and for
the Iowa statute governing sales of corporate securities. 15 Con-
sent was implied from certain acts of the nonresident, for exam-
ple, operating a motor vehicle on state highways or sale of se-
curities.' But the Supreme Court sidestepped this position and
based its decisions on the exceptional nature of the activities. 7
The court reasoned that in the public interest the state could
provide a convenient method of redress for its citizens on a
cause of action arising from the activities of the nonresident
defendant. The point of focus had shifted from consent to serv-
ice of process to the nature of the nonresident's activities within
the state.
In International Shoe Co. v. Washington'8 the Supreme Court
re-examined the entire question of the due process requirements
for in personam jurisdiction over nonresidents and announced
the broad and honest rule that due process "requires only that
in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if
he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have cer-
tain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the
suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and sub-
stantial justice.' "'9 The court emphasized that this test was not
mechanical or quantitative, but rather concentrated on the "qual-
ity and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly
administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due
process clause to insure. '20 That clause did not contemplate that
a state may make binding a judgment in personam against an
individual or corporate defendant with which the state has no
contacts, ties, or relations. 2' By stating that criteria for due
13. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
14. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
15. Doherty v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623, 627 (1935).
16. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927) ; Doherty v. Goodman, 294 U.S.
623 (1935).
17. See cases cited note 16 supra.
18. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
19. Id. at 316.
20. Id. at 319.
21. Ibid.
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process were not to be applied quantitatively, but rather in terms
of the nature and quality of the activity, the Court indicated
that under the new rule a single act by the defendant in the state
could be sufficient to support jurisdiction over the nonresident
defendant.22
Under the Pennoyer-physical power rule, the Supreme Court
recognized exceptions based on the special need for states to
regulate certain activities within their borders - the operation
of motor vehicles and sale of securities are two examples28 - and
allowed states to exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresidents
based on these activities. The need for the exercise of jurisdic-
tion in certain instances was likewise recognized under the Inter-
national Shoe rule as one of the factors to be considered in deter-
mining whether the exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident
in a particular case violated due process. In Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co. 24 the Court upheld a New York stat-
ute which authorized local courts to adjudicate a suit for ac-
counting by a New York trustee in a trust established under a
New York law against nonresident trust beneficiaries on the
ground that the interest of each state in providing means to close
trusts created under its laws and supervised by its courts is so
insistent that its courts have the right to determine the interests
of all claimants, resident and nonresident. 25
In McGee v. International Life Ins. Co. 2 6 a California stat-
ute27 which subjected foreign corporations to suit in California
courts on insurance contracts issued or delivered to California
residents was upheld. The defendant insurer's chief contact with
California had been the issuance of a re-insurance policy to a
California resident. The Court found, in addition, that the con-
tract was delivered in California, premiums were mailed from
there, and the insured was a resident of California when he
died.28 The manifest interest California had in providing a
forum of redress for its residents against insurers who refuse
to settle their claims was also emphasized.2 The Court remarked
22. Id. at 318.
23. Doherty v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623, 627 (1935); Hess v. Pawloski, 274
U.S. 352, 356 (1927).
24. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
25. Id. at 313.
26. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
27. CAL. INS. CODE § 1611.
28. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957).
29. Ibid.
[Vol. XXVI
COMMENTS
that the severe economic disadvantages of forcing a claimant,
especially one with a small claim, to pursue the insurer to its
home state would deprive the claimant of a legal remedy, and,
further, that crucial witnesses were in the claimant's area.8 0 The
inconvenience to the insurer was discussed, but it was not held
to constitute a denial of due process.81
The Court stated that "the suit was based on a contract
which had substantial connection with that State, '8 2 and, if a
single contract can be a "substantial connection" sufficient to
satisfy due process requirements, it can be strongly argued that
an act or omission within the state which amounts to a tort
should likewise be the "substantial connection" or minimum con-
tacts with the state sufficient to satisfy the requirements of due
process. Although the Court talked of "substantial connection,"
it concentrated on other factors - manifest interest of the state
to provide a forum for its citizens, the economic disadvantage
of a plaintiff forced to bring suit in the defendant's state, the
presence of key witnesses in the plaintiff's area. 8 In a tort ac-
tion these factors would be equally compelling, if not more so.
If the state has a manifest interest in protecting the contract
rights of its citizens, it clearly has a manifest interest in pro-
viding a forum for citizens who have suffered personal injury
or property damage through the tortious behavior of another,
and in almost every case witnesses to the events and circum-
stances of the injury will be in the plaintiff's state, and the eco-
nomic disadvantage of suit in defendant's state could be equally
disadvantageous. The reasoning in McGee lends great support
to statutes which grant courts jurisdiction over nonresidents on
the basis of a tort committed within the state.
In Hanson v. Denckla,34 the latest Supreme Court ruling in
this area, a Pennsylvania resident had created an inter vivos
trust with a Delaware trust company and subsequently moved
to Florida. The settlor executed an instrument providing for
the distribution of funds after her death. For several years
she continued to receive income checks and communications from
the Delaware trustee. After her death, some of the beneficiaries
brought suit to set aside the trust agreement, and the issue was
30. Ibid.
31. Id. at 224.
32. Id. at 223.
33. Ibid.
34. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
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raised whether the Florida courts had jurisdiction over the trus-
tee. The majority held that they did not, pointing out that the
standards of International Shoe sprang from the territorial lim-
itations of states and were not merely guarantees against incon-
venient litigation. 35 Even if the burdens of defending were
minimal, the defendant must have the requisite minimal con-
tacts.86 The Court found that these contacts were lacking be-
cause the defendant maintained no office in Florida, transacted
no business in Florida, and the cause of action did not arise out
of an act or transaction within the state.37 The Court empha-
sized that a relationship or connection with a nonresident is not
sufficient to establish the minimum contacts; "it is essential
... that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully
avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within
the ... State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its
laws." 38 This is the factor which seems to distinguish Denckla
from McGee. In McGee the defendant initiated in California the
transaction which gave rise to the cause of action, and there-
by invoked the benefit and protection of California laws. In
Denckla the transaction was completed before the settlor moved
to Florida and, therefore, the Court reasoned, the defendant had
not invoked the protection of its laws. In so reasoning the Court
added a new dimension to the "minimum contact" rule: the
defendant must deliberately avail himself of the privilege of act-
ing with the state; merely carrying out transactions consum-
mated in another state will not be sufficient. 9
The decision, however, was by a divided Court. The dissent
reasoned that it was not fundamentally unfair to require the
defendant trustee to answer in Florida because the trustee had
communicated with the settlor in Florida regularly and had car-
ried on business relations with her for eight years.40 It also
noted that Florida had a real interest because the appointment
had been made in Florida by a Florida domiciliary, the primary
beneficiaries lived in Florida, and the will was being adminis-
tered in Florida.41 In addition, it would prevent "multitple liti-
35. Id. at 250.
36. Ibid.
37. Id. at 251.
38. Id. at 253.
39. Ibid.
40. Id. at 259.
41. Id. at 258.
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gation with its accompanying waste and possibility of inconsist-
ent results. '42
In Denckla the Court faced a choice of emphasis. The ma-
jority, emphasizing minimum contacts, denied jurisdiction with
the stern remark that the standards set forth in International
Shoe were not merely an attempt to protect litigants from incon-
venient suits, but rather sprang from the territorial limitations
on state judicial power, and the defendants' minimum contacts
were a prerequisite to the exercise of that power. The minority
emphasized the interest of the state, the need to eliminate multi-
ple litigation, and the danger of inconsistent decisions, but also
noted the continuous contacts in the form of communications
and payments. Justice Black, who wrote the dissent in Denckla,
had written the majority opinion in McGee, which had likewise
emphasized the contacts in the form of regular payments of
premiums, the convenience of suit in California, the presence of
important witnesses, and the interest of the state in providing a
forum for its residents with claims against foreign insurers.4
Denckla appears to be a deliberate limitation on McGee and an
attempt to assert the paramount importance of the "minimum
contacts" over factors such as state interest, avoidance of mul-
tiple litigation with the possibility of conflicting decisions, and
availability of evidence. It must be remembered, however, that
this decision was by a divided court, and, therefore, that there is
still some uncertainty in this area. It is possible that today a
case similar to Denckla might sustain jurisdiction. But until
this happens, jurisdiction must be determined in the light of the
contacts which the defendant had with the state; and factors
such as convenience of the parties, prevention of multiple liti-
gation, and the state's manifest interest in safeguarding its citi-
zens by providing a forum to adjudicate their rights and to
redress their injuries are important and relevant, but are not
controlling. Under this rule, it seems clear that the commission
of a tort through an act or omission in the state could be "suffi-
cient minimum contact" to provide a basis for personal jurisdic-
tion over the nonresident tortfeasor. Although this question has
not been settled by the Supreme Court, it has been adjudicated
by several state and federal courts.
42. Id. at 261.
43. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957).
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In Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp.," a foreign cor-
poration negligently damaged plaintiff's home in attempting to
re-roof it. The Vermont Supreme Court upheld the validity of
service of process on the Secretary of State under a Vermont
statute which provided that if a foreign corporation commits a
tort in whole or in part in the state it shall be deemed to be
doing business in Vermont and to have appointed the Secretary
of State agent for service of process in actions arising out of
the tort.45 The court held that it did not violate due process to
require a defendant who had committed a tort within the state
to submit to jurisdiction of the courts of that state on a cause
of action arising from that tort.
4
This case was decided after the International Shoe decision,
but prior to McGee, and it is significant that the opinion con-
centrated on the fundamental fairness of requiring the defend-
ant to answer in Vermont.47 He had chosen to enter Vermont
and had enjoyed the protection of Vermont laws, and should be
answerable under them as well. Since the tort was committed
in Vermont, its law would govern the liability. Most of the nec-
essary witnesses were in Vermont, and to require the plaintiff
to pursue his action in defendant's home state would be pro-
hibitively expensive. The defendant's only contact had been the
commission of the tort within the state, and this had been held
sufficient.
A similar result was reached in Illinois in a case 48 which
arose after McGee and under a statute49 which provided that
the commission of a tortious act within the state subjects the
tortfeasor to the jurisdiction of the Illinois courts on a cause
of action arising from the tortious act. The defendant, a Wis-
consin resident, sent his employees into Illinois to deliver a stove.
The plaintiff was negligently injured by the employees while
he was assisting them in unloading the stove. The court stated
that the jurisdictional requirements are met when the defend-
ant is the author of acts or omissions within the state and the
complaint alleges a cause of action in tort arising from the con-
44. 116 Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 664 (1951).
45. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 855 (1947).
46. Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp., 116 Vt. 569, 575, 80 A.2d 664,
668 (1951).
47. Ibid.
48. Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill.2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957).
49. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 17(1) (b) (1961).
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duct.50 That the defendants had enjoyed the protection of Illinois
law, that most of the important witnesses were in Illinois, and
that Illinois substantive law governed were given considerable
weight. 51 In this regard the reasoning of the Illinois court was
similar to that of the Vermont Court 52 and of the Supreme Court
in McGee,53 but the court also emphasized that jurisdiction was
based on the legitimate interest of the state in providing redress
against those who have substantial contacts with the state and
incur obligations to its residents. 54 The legitimate interest con-
cept was an important factor in the McGee case,5 5 but the danger
of such reasoning is that it can easily lead to an over-emphasis
of "legitimate interest," thereby overshadowing the most impor-
tant element - the substantial contacts. As pointed out in
Denckla, jurisdiction is governed by the territorial limitations
on the power of the states and is not controlled by the legitimate
interests of the states.5" It follows that since the basis is terri-
torial power, the defendant must have contact and connection
with the territory over which the state has power,57 and the
most important question is how much contact is necessary. The
nature of the contact is more important than the quantity; at
this point the legitimate interests of the state become relevant.
If the nature of the contact is of such importance to the welfare
of its citizens that the state control and regulate the activity,
then the state has power to regulate it directly or by providing
redress in its courts. Therefore, when the defendant's activity
or contact falls within the ambit of the state's legitimate or
manifest interest, such as operating a motor vehicle 58 or com-
mitting a tort,59 then a single act would be sufficient.
In the light of the rulings of the Supreme Court 0 and the
decisions in other jurisdictions,6 the provisions of the Louisiana
50. Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill.2d 378, 393, 143 N.E.2d 673, 681 (1957).
51. Id. at 391, 143 N.E.2d at 680.
52. Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp., 116 Vt. 569, 575, 80 A.2d 664,
668 (1951).
53. 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957).
54. Nelson v. Miller, 11 ll.2d 379, 389, 143 N.E.2d 673, 679 (1957).
55. 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957).
56. 357 U.S. 235, 250 (1958).
57. Id. at 253.
58. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
59. See Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill.2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957); Smyth v.
Twin State Improvement Corp., 116 Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 664 (1951).
60. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) ; McGee v.
International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) ; Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S.
235 (1958).
61. See note 59 supra.
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statute granting the courts jurisdiction over a nonresident on a
cause of action based on the commission of an offense or quasi-
offense through an act or omission in Louisiana appears to be
a valid exercise of power and does not violate the requirements
of due process.
ACT OR OMISSION OUTsIDE THE STATE
If a nonresident commits an offense or quasi offense through
an act or omission outside the state and causes injury or dam-
age in Louisiana, would the Louisiana courts have jurisdiction
over the nonresident? There are no Supreme Court rulings
directly in point; the only relevant decisions are the Interna-
tional Shoe, McGee, and Denckla cases, which have been dis-
cussed earlier. The rule established by these decisions, especially
Denckla, is that jurisdiction is restricted by the territorial limi-
tations on the states' power, and, therefore, the defendant must
have sufficient and deliberate contact with the states so that
the exercise of jurisdiction is not offensive to principles of fair-
ness and justice.
Various forms have been used in the drafting of statutes
establishing jurisdiction over nonresident tortfeasors. The pur-
pose of this section is to examine these forms through the juris-
prudence arising under these statutes and then to evaluate the
Louisiana statute in light of the experience of other jurisdic-
tions.
Five states have adopted statutes which provide that any
person committing a tortious act within the state is subject to
jurisdiction of the state in causes of action arising from the
tortious act.0 2 The use of the phrase "tortious act within the
state" raised the initial question whether this statute could apply
where the negligent act or omission occurred outside the state.
In Nelson v. Miller, discussed earlier, the Illinois Supreme Court
held that the jurisdictional requirements were met when the
defendant is the author of acts or omissions within the state
and the cause of action arises from the conduct. 3 But since the
negligence in Nelson had occurred in Illinois, the court was not
confronted with the question of out-of-state negligence. This
62. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (1961) ; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 704
(1964); N.M. REV. CODES ANN. § 21-3-16 (Supp. 1965); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. ACT
302(a) (1) ; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 4.28.185 (1959).
63. See text accompanying notes 48-54 supra.
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issue was raised, however, in Hellriegel v. Sears Roebuck & Co.04
An Illinois resident had been injured by a lawnmower manufac-
tured in part by a Wisconsin corporation and assembled by an
Ohio corporation which had shipped it to the Illinois corporation
from which plaintiff had purchased it. The Wisconsin defend-
ant's only contact with Illinois had been the presence of the
lawnmowers. The Ohio defendant, in addition to shipping the
machines into Illinois, had sent representatives to discuss sales
with Sears Roebuck and to enter into oral contracts for the
shipment and sales of the mowers. The federal district court in
Illinois held that the statute could not support jurisdiction where
the cause of action arises out of local injuries caused by acts
or omissions outside Illinois. The act must be committed in
Illinois. The Illinois Supreme Court repudiated this interpreta-
tion in a later case. In Gray v. American Radiator & Standard
Corp.,5 a defective safety valve, negligently manufactured by an
Ohio corporation and installed in a water heater by a Penn-
sylvania corportion, caused the water heater to explode in Illi-
nois, injuring the Illinois purchaser. The court held that the
statute was applicable where the negligent act or omission oc-
curred outside Illinois and the injury was sustained in Illinois
by reasoning that to be "tortious" an act must cause injury, and,
therefore, it was impossible to separate the act from the con-
sequences.0 6 Having ruled that the statute applied, the court
considered whether there was sufficient contact with the state
to satisfy requirements of due process. There was no showing
whether either defendant had transacted any business in Illinois
other than the sale involved in the case, but the court found
that it was reasonable to infer that the defendants' commercial
transactions probably resulted in substantial use and consump-
tion in Illinois and that the defendants derived considerable
benefit from the sale of appliances in Illinois and had enjoyed
the protection of Illinois law.67 The court concluded that, in the
light of the defendants' contacts with Illinois, it was fair and
in accord with the principles of due process to require them to
answer in Illinois courts for damage caused by their products.
In addition, the court found that it would be convenient from
the standpoint of investigating the accident and the availability
of witnesses to try the case in Illinois, and, further, that Illinois
64. 157 F. Supp. 718 (N.D. Ill. 1957).
65. 22 Ill.2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
66. Id. at 435, 176 N.E.2d at 763.
67. Id. at 442, 176 N.E.2d at 766.
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substantive law would be applied.6 8 The Gray decision is im-
portant in several respects. By interpreting the phrase "tortious
act within the state" to encompass situations where only the
injury occurred within the state, the court expanded consider-
ably the jurisdiction of Illinois courts in in personam actions.
In a later case, 69 the federal district court in Illinois reiterated
the interpretation of the Hellriegel and Nelson cases that "tor-
tious act" refers to the act or conduct and not to the conse-
quences, and that therefore there must be acts or omissions in
Illinois; the occurrence of the injury in Illinois would not be
sufficient. But since the Illinois Supreme Court had interpreted
"tortious act" to apply where the injury was sustained in Illinois,
but the negligent act had occurred outside the state, the federal
court was compelled to follow this interpretation and upheld
jurisdiction where the plaintiff, a stewardess, was injured in
Illinois as a result of negligent design and construction of de-
fendant's airplane.
In this case the court seems to have misinterpreted the Gray
decision. It is true that, as interpreted by Gray, the Illinois
statute is applicable where the negligent acts or omissions occur
outside the state and the injury is sustained within the state.
But Gray does not hold that this fact alone is sufficient to sus-
tain jurisdiction. The defendants were subjected to the juris-
diction of the Illinois courts because the court found it reason-
able to infer that there had been substantial use and consump-
tion of their products in Illinois and that because they had de-
rived substantial benefit from this consumption, it was just that
they answer for injuries sustained in Illinois from the use and
consumption of their products."
In Nixon v. Cohen71 jurisdiction was upheld under the "tor-
tious act within the state" provision of the Washington statute
where plaintiffs were injured while riding an amusement ma-
chine at a fair. The court found that the defendant, an Oregon
corporation, knew that the machine was to be used in Wash-
ington and has installed special lights for that purpose. The de-
fendant had retained property interest in the machine and had
agreed to service it whenever necessary. The defendant had
68. Ibid.
69. McMahon v. Boeing Airplane Co., 199 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. Ill. 1961).
But 8ee Anderson v. Penncraft Tool Co., 200 F. Supp. 145 (N.D. Ill. 1961).
70. 22 Ill.2d 432, 442, 176 N.E.2d 761, 766 (1961).
71. 62 Wash.2d 987, 385 P.2d 305 (1963).
[Vol. XXVI
COMMENTS
visited the fair to discuss lighting and other factors. In holding
that the defendant had committed a tortious act within Washing-
ton, the court relied on the reasoning in Gray because the Wash-
ington statute had been copied from Illinois. In sustaining juris-
diction the court considered the interest of a state in protecting
its citizens from inherently dangerous machines, the inconven-
ience of suit in defendant's state, the defendant's activities in
connection with the operation of the machine, and the avail-
ability of witnesses in Washington, and the fact that the de-
fendant had retained a property interest in the machine.7 2 It is
significant that although the court mentioned the minimum or
sufficient contacts, it preferred to concentrate on the factors
of state interest, inconvenience to the plaintiff, availability of
witnesses, and protection of state laws afforded the defendant.
This case was decided after Denckla and indicates a persistent
tendency of courts to concentrate on factors other than the de-
fendant's contacts with the state in determining jurisdiction.
The result was correct because the defendant had the requisite
minimum contacts, but it seems that the reasoning of the court
fails to place proper emphasis on the fundamental requirement
for jurisdiction - sufficient contacts with the forum state.
Other statutes provide for jurisdiction over foreign corpora-
tions by specifying that the commission of a tort in whole or in
part is doing business in the state, and making the Secretary of
State the agent for service of process in actions arising out of
the tort.78 This type of statute is restricted in scope to foreign
corporations and in flexibility by employing the concepts of
"doing business." This concept arose prior to the International
Shoe case and was originally more restrictive than the "mini-
mum contacts" test.
In Mueller v. Steelcase,74 jurisdiction was denied by the fed-
eral district court where a Minnesota resident was injured by
a defective chair manufactured by a foreign corporation and
sold through a local retailer. The court noted that Minnesota
law would apply, that all of plaintiff's witnesses were in Minne-
sota though all evidence of negligence in manufacture was in
72. Id. at 998-99, 385 P.2d at 312.
73. IOWA CODE ANN. § 617.3 (1962) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 303.13(3) (1957)
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 300:14 (Supp. 1961); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
2031(b) (1959) ; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 855 (1959); W. VA. CODE ANN.
§3083 (1957).
74. 172 F. Supp. 416 (D. Minn. 1959).
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defendant corporation's state; but held that defendant's con-
tacts with Minnesota were insufficient to sustain jurisdiction."
The defendant owned no property in Minnesota, was not licensed
to do business there, and its only representative was a salesman
living in Iowa who received only ten percent of the orders. The
majority of orders were sent directly to the defendant. The
court found that the defendant had performed no tortious act
in Minnesota and concluded that it violated due process to hold
that the mere fact of injury in Minnesota from a tortious act
committed outside the state constituted doing business and sub-
jected the defendants to jurisdiction of Minnesota. 76 To hold
otherwise would mean that a Minnesota resident who bought a
chair in defendant's home state, returned to Minnesota, and was
subsequently injured could subject the defendant to the jurisdic-
tion of Minnesota courts. 77 This argument seems unanswerable
and supports the rule that the defendant must have sufficient
connection with the state apart from the fact of injury in the
state. The court was concerned over the possible implications
of expanding the jurisdiction. The Supreme Court in Denckla
voiced a similar concern when it stated that the defendant must
purposefully avail himself of the privilege of conducting activi-
ties within the state.78
In Atkins v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.79 plaintiff was
injured while unloading the defendant's product. The defendant
manufactured acid and shipped it in containers produced by co-
defendant Jones & Laughlin. It maintained no offices, and no
agents or employees were present, in Minnesota. All sales were
made in the New York office and all payments were made to
the New York office. The Minnesota Supreme Court relied on
the principle that the place of injury is where the legal wrong
occurs and held that the defendant had committed a tort in
Minnesota and was subject to its jurisdiction.80 The court noted
the concern expressed in Mueller that, if jurisdiction were up-
held where the injury occurred in the state from out-of-state
negligence, minimum contacts requirements would be swept
away, but reasoned that this concern was outweighed by the
interest of Minnesota in providing redress in its courts for its
75. Id. at 418.
76. Id. at 419.
77. Ibid.
78. 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). See text accompanying note 38 supra.
79. 258 Minn. 571, 104 N.W.2d 888 (1960).
80. Id. at 578, 104 N.W.2d at 893.
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citizens injured by use of products from out of state.81 Although
the Atkins case appears to hold that the single fact of injury
within the state is sufficient minimum contact to support juris-
diction, a careful reading of the opinion reveals that the de-
fendant had been shipping its acid into Minnesota for fifty
years, and this would certainly fulfill the minimum contacts
requirement of due process. In addition, the shipment of acid is
such a potentially dangerous activity that the court could be
justified in exercising jurisdiction based on a single shipment
because of the state's interest in regulating dangerous activities.
Exceptions have always been recognized where a high degree
of risk is created by the activity, e.g., the nonresident motorist
statutes.
In a subsequent case, Pendzimas v. Eastern Metal Prod.
Corp.,8 2 a Minnesota citizen was injured by a deep fat fryer
manufactured by a New York corporation. The defendant's only
contact with the state was the presence of the product. The
federal district court refused to follow the reasoning of the
Atkins decision on the issue whether defendant's activity con-
stituted the commission of a tort in whole or in part in Minne-
sota. Atkins held that negligence out of state which causes in-
jury in Minnesota constitutes the commission of a tort in whole
or in part in Minnesota. The federal court held that the act or
omission must be performed in Minnesota and that under the
facts the defendant lacked the requisite contacts.83
It is important to note that Mueller-Pendzimas decisions
differ with the Atkins decision initially on the construction to
be given to the phrase "a tort in whole or in part." Atkins con-
strued it to apply where the negligence occurred outside Minne-
sota but the injury was sustained within the state. Mueller-
Pendzimas hold that the statute is to be applied only where the
negligent act or omission is performed in Minnesota. Atkins
cannot be used as support for the broad rule that the single fact
of injury caused by out-of-state negligence is sufficient contact
to support jurisdiction, even though loose language in the opin-
ion might indicate that it could. It cannot, because in Atkins
the defendant had sufficient contacts apart from the injury in
the fact that it had been shipping acid into Minnesota for fifty
81. Id. at 580, 104 N.W.2d at 894.
82. 218.F. Supp. 524 (D. Minn. 1961).
83. Id. at 527.
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years. In addition, Atkins concerned an inherently dangerous
substance, and jurisdiction could be upheld on the basis of the
state's power to regulate dangerous activities either directly or
indirectly by subjecting them to suit in its courts.
In the latest Minnesota Supreme Court case, Ehlers v. United
States Heating & Cooling Mfg. Corp.,84 jurisdiction was sus-
tained where the foreign corporation's only contact with Minne-
sota was the presence of the boiler which caused the fire. The
court reasoned that the defendant had manufactured the product
for general use and that sales to Minnesota buyers in the ordi-
nary course of business was to be anticipated. 85 Jurisdiction was
apparently based on defendants' contacts through the presence
of his products in the ordinary course of trade which was to
be anticipated by defendant.8 6 Because the defendant would de-
rive substantial benefit from sale of his product and the protec-
tion afforded by Minnesota law, it is fair that he answer in
Minnesota courts for injuries caused by his products.
Iowa's "long-arm" statute is similar to that of Minnesota in
providing for the exercise of jurisdiction if the foreign corpora-
tion commits a tort in whole or in part.87 In Anderson v. Na-
tional Presto Industries, Inc.,88 a Wisconsin corporation had
manufactured a coffee-maker which had been obtained by plain-
tiff from an Iowa stamp-redemption store. The court construed
the statute to apply where injury but not the negligent act or
omission occurred within the state by relying on the principle
that the place of wrong is the state where the last event neces-
sary to make an actor liable for tort takes place. Having ruled
that the statute applied, the court considered the defendant's
contacts to determine whether the application of the statute
would offend the principles of due process. The court held that
the defendant had the required contacts by reasoning that the
defendant had sold his product for general use wherever markets
could be found. Defendant had placed his products in the stream
of commerce and they were protected by the laws of the states
84. 267 Minn. 56, 124 N.W.2d 824 (1963). See also Aftanase v. Economy
Baler Co., 343 F.2d 187 (8th Cir. 1965) ; Williams v. Connolly, 227 F. Supp. 539
(D. Minn. 1964) ; Adamek v. Michigan Door Co., 260 Minn. 54, 108 N.W.2d 607
(1961).
85. Ehlers v. United States Heating & Cooling Mfg. Corp., 267 Minn. 56, 61,
124 N.W.2d 824, 827 (1963).
86. Ibid.
87. IOWA CODE ANN. § 617.3 (1962).
88. 135 N.W.2d 639 (Iowa 1965).
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into which they passed. Defendant, therefore, should assume the
burden of defending suits in states where his products caused
injury as well as enjoy the benefits. The court relied on the
Gray and Ehlers cases. The dissent argued that the plaintiff
must prove substantial use and consumption in this state in
order to support jurisdiction because the premise for jurisdic-
tion is that defendant by act or conduct invokes the benefit and
protection of the laws of the forum.
Under a similar statute,8 9 the Vermont Supreme Court in
O'Brien v. Comstock" refused to sustain jurisdiction on the basis
of the plaintiff's allegation that the defendant had placed his
product into the stream of commerce, because it was insufficient
to show a voluntary contact or intentional participation in Ver-
mont. One of the defendant's cans of food offered for sale in
Vermont had contained glass and plaintiff suffered injury from
consuming the contents. The court stated that the vital factor
in the Vermont statute is the intentional and affirmative action
within the state on the part of the nonresident defendant in
pursuit of its corporate activities.9 1 A single act purposefully
performed in Vermont would subject the actor to jurisdiction
of Vermont courts,92 as would active participation in the Ver-
mont market, either by direct shipment or by transmission
through regular distributors serving Vermont. The prerequisite
is the defendant's intentional participation. Jurisdiction failed
in this case because the plaintiff failed to prove that the de-
fendant intended that his product reach Vermont or that by
his present or past commercial activity he should have realized
that his packages could cause harm in Vermont. The mere pres-
ence of the cans was not sufficient.
The North Carolina statute provides for jurisdiction over
foreign corporations based on tortious conduct in the state,
whether from repeated activity or a single act and also out of
the production, manufacture, or distribution of goods with the
reasonable expectation that the goods are to be used or con-
sumed in the state and they are so used and consumed.9 8 It is
not important how or where the goods are produced or sold.
Although the language is very broad, the courts have applied it
89. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 855 (1959).
90. 123 Vt. 461, 194 A.2d 568 (1963).
91. Id. at 464, 194 A.2d at 570.
92. Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp., 116 Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 664 (1951).
93. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-145 (1955).
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restrictively. Jurisdiction was denied by a federal court of ap-
peals where the resident was injured when a tractor manufac-
tured by a nonresident defendant overturned on him.9 4 The
tractor had been sold to the local dealer by defendant's wholly
owned and controlled subsidiary. The corporations were con-
sidered separate entities and this barred jurisdiction over the
defendant. Jurisdiction was also denied where a North Carolina
corporation purchased yarn from a foreign corporation at the
New York plant 5 The goods were shipped to North Carolina,
but this contact was held insufficient even though service had
been made on defendant's manager while he was investigating
the complaint in North Carolina. The North Carolina Supreme
Court held that defendant had insufficient contacts where a
defective lawn mower had been purchased from a local dealer
who had received it from an out-of-state independent contrac-
tor.9 6 The defendant was an Illinois corporation who distributed
goods in North Carolina through out-of-state distributors and
independent contractors. Jurisdiction was upheld on a cause of
action based upon the explosion of a defective water heater
where the defendant had regular orders through representatives,
some of whom resided in North Carolina.9 7 The defendant had
done a substantial volume of business and, in turn, had pur-
chased goods from local suppliers.
The Wisconsin and Maryland statutes are similar to Lou-
isiana's 9s in that they require some contact in addition to the
injury to person or property arising out of an act or omission
outside the state. The Wisconsin statute9 9 requires that solicita-
tion or service activities have been carried on within the state
by or on behalf of the defendant, or products, materials, or
things processed, serviced or manufactured by defendant have
been used or consumed within the state in the ordinary course
of trade. Maryland requires that the defendant regularly do or
solicit business, or engage in any other persistent course of con-
94. Harris v. Deere & Co., 223 F.2d 161 (4th Cir. 1955).
95. Erlanger Mills v. Cohoes Fiber Mills, 239 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956).
96. Moss v. City of Winston-Salem, 254 N.C. 480, 119 S.E.2d 445 (1961).
97. Shepard v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 249 N.C. 454, 106 S.E.2d 704 (1959).
9S. LA. R.S. 13:3201 (Supp. 1964) : "A court may exercise personal juris-
diction over a nonresident, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of
action arising from the nonresidents . . . (d) causing injury or damage in this
state by an offense or quasi-offense committed through an act or omission outside
of this state if he regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other per-
sistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or con-
sumed or services rendered, in this state."
99. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 262.05 (Supp. 1965).
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duct, or derive substantial revenue from food or services used
or consumed in the state.1°0 These statutes are different from
other statutes governing jurisdiction over nonresidents in sev-
eral respects. Both statutes are clear that an injury sustained
in the state from a negligent act outside the state in itself is not
sufficient to support jurisdiction. This appears to be the posi-
tion taken by the majority of courts and seems to be the position
strongly implied by the majority opinion in Denckla that the
defendant must purposefully avail himself of the privilege of
carrying on business in the state. In these statutes the emphasis
is placed on the defendant's connection with the state and this,
in the final analysis, is the basis for jurisdiction. It is in spelling
out the requisite contacts that the statutes differ from each
other. The significance of these differences can only be revealed
through judicial interpretation and experience.
In clearly defining the contacts which are necessary to sup-
port jurisdiction where the negligent act or omission occurred
outside the state, Louisiana's long-arm statute appears to be the
most accurate and the most workable expression of the due
process requirements established by the Supreme Court in Inter-
national Shoe, McGee, and Denckla. It is the most accurate
because it clearly expresses the rule applied almost universally
by other jurisdictions. The rule is that where the injury occurs
within the state as a result of negligence outside the state, the
nonresident defendant must have substantial contact with the
state apart from the injury. The courts are liberal in the applica-
tion of the substantial contact test and several follow the theory
that if the defendant places his goods into interstate commerce
he intends for them to be sold wherever there is a market. Since
he derives benefit from the widespread distribution of his goods
and enjoys the protection of the laws of the various states, he
should bear the burden of answering in states where his products
cause injury. But liberal as they may be, the overwhelming ma-
jority require substantial contacts and refuse to hold that the
fact of injury alone is sufficient to support jurisdiction.
The Louisiana statute is the most workable because separate
provisions for negligent acts within the state and without the
state spare the courts the necessity of determining whether a
tort was committed in whole or in part in this state or whether
100. MD. ANN. CODE art. 75, § 96(a) (Supp. 1964). See Gilliam v. Moog
Industries Inc., 239 Md. 107, 210 A.2d 390 (1965).
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"tortious act" refers to injury or to negligent acts. In addition,
by prescribing in detail the contacts that are required where
the negligent acts occur outside the state, the statute has saved
the courts the confusing and perplexing problems of weighing
factors such as manifest interest of the state, convenience to
the parties, avoidance of multiple litigation, and the availability
of witnesses. It has also placed the emphasis on the fundamental
basis for jurisdiction over nonresidents - the nature and extent
of their contact with the state.10 '
Howard W. L'Enfant, Jr.
101. The scope of this Comment has been restricted to an analysis of LA.
R.S. 13:3201 (Supp. 1964), but many of the same results with respect to foreign
corporations can be obtained under LA. R.S. 13:3471 (Supp. 1964).
